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ABSTRACT
This article presents a particular viewpoint on how nudge should be understood. The concept of  nudge has generated consid-
erable interest among academics and policymakers. However, ten years later, what is meant exactly by “nudge” is still a matter 
of  debate. In fact, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the (original) narrow definition of  Thaler and Sunstein (nudge in 
the narrow sense, NN) and the (later) broad definition of  Sunstein (nudge in the broad sense, NB). These two definitions differ 
regarding the instrumental use of  rationality failures, and accordingly whether the provision or disclosure of  information counts 
as a nudge or not. From a pragmatic perspective, the paper argues for a position that consists of  adopting the broad definition 
of  a nudge while acknowledging several types of  nudges, which we provide in an integrative view. We suggest that future research 
should assess the effectiveness of  these different types of  nudges separately.
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INTRODUCTION
As defined by Thaler and Sunstein1 in their eponymous book, a nudge is a type of  non-coercive intervention on behaviors/
choices. Nudging is not new (for instance, marketers have consist-
ently nudged consumers as part of  their branding, packaging and 
advertising strategies). Rather, the novelty of  nudge lies in the the-
oretical body of  work in which it is embedded. In fact, Thaler and 
Sunstein (henceforth T&S) emphasized that interest should focus 
on nudges serving a particular goal: promoting individual and so-
cial welfare. In this perspective, governments can use nudges pa-
ternalistically as a type of  policy intervention alongside traditional 
policy tools (i.e., regulatory and economic measures). Moreover, as 
nudge interventions preserve freedom of  choice; they implement 
the political doctrine of  libertarian paternalism previously defined 
by Thaler and Sunstein.2
 Despite the fact that nudge has been massively discussed 
in various academic areas, this concept remains ill-defined for at 
least two reasons. The first one is that most research confounds 
nudge as a method of  behavior change (the mean of  nudging) 
and nudge as a type of  policy intervention (the goal of  nudging). 
That confusion mainly results from T&S insisting that the focus 
should be on welfare-promoting nudges (in their hands, “paternal-
istic nudges” is almost a pleonasm). However, as Hansen3 empha-
sized, the notion of  “nudge” is not necessarily related to that of  
“libertarian paternalism” so that we should adopt a technical (i.e., 
goal-independent) definition of  a nudge. As a method of  behavior 
change, a nudge can serve either private or public interests (pater-
nalistic nudges). Consider the following example: if  putting fruits 
at eye-level in a cafeteria is considered as a nudge, then putting 
candies at eye- level in a supermarket should also be considered as 
one.
 The second reason why the concept of  nudge is ill-de-
fined is that the very definition of  a nudge as a method of  behavior 
change is still unclear and controversial. In fact, the equivocal na-
ture of  the concept, coupled with the variety of  examples provided 
by T&S have fueled a lot a discussion about what nudges really 
are.3-5 On one hand, finding common defining features to the large 
variety of  nudge interventions is challenging. On the other hand, 
adopting a precise definition of  nudge leaves eventually few exam-
ples fitting that definition.4 In fact, many authors highlighted that 
some of  the examples provided by T&S do not fit with their own 
definition.6 Some authors have addressed that conceptual issue by 
amending the original definition of  nudge,3,7 others by distinguish-
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ing different types of  nudges.8-10
 The present paper relies upon the three main definitions 
of  nudge advanced by T&S and Sunstein.11,12 We first distinguish 
between broad and narrow senses of  the term “nudge”. Then we 
argue why we should adopt a broad definition of  nudge, and we 
finally provide an integrative view of  the different types of  nudges 
that nudge in the broad sense covers.
 
NUDGE IN THE NARROW VS. BROAD SENSE
In their early work, T&S come up with two definitions of  nudge:
Definition 1: “A nudge, as we will use the term, is an aspect of  
the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way 
without forbidding any option or significantly changing their economic 
incentives”.1
Definition 2: “In accordance with our definition, a nudge is any factor 
that significantly alters the behavior of  Humans although it would be 
ignored by Econs”.1
 These two definitions (and their later refinement) de-
scribe nudging in the narrow sense (NN), revolving around the 
idea that nudge interventions work by harnessing rationality fail-
ures or by “exploiting cognitive biases”. NN are rationally neutral (what 
Tor13 referred to as the “rational neutrality” condition) so that defini-
tion 2 derives from definition 1.1  The rationale is as follows: under 
perfect information, rational agents make their choices based on 
their own preferences and the constraints (option set) they face. In 
such conditions, choices that people make reveal their preferences. 
As a nudge intervention leaves the rational determinants of  choice 
(option set and economic incentives) unchanged (definition 1), it 
would therefore not affect the behavior of  Econs (definition 2), 
and any change in behavior observed could only be attributed to 
non-rational (i.e., behavioral) factors, namely rationality failures.2 
Put differently, nudges use these rationality failures instrumental-
ly14. Noteworthy, the rational neutrality is the signature of  NN, 
which separates it from other psychological approaches to behav-
ior change such as rational persuasion or motivation.15 The defini-
tions that followed that of  T&S confirmed the instrumental use of  
rationality failures as the defining feature of  nudge.3,5,16,17
 More recently, Sunstein11,12 endorsed a significantly differ-
ent definition of  nudge:
Definition 3: “Nudges are private or public initiatives that steer people 
in particular directions but that also allow them to go their own way”.12
 Such a large definition describes nudge in the broad sense 
(NB). According to Sunstein, the defining feature of  nudges is not 
the instrumental use of  rationality failures but rather the preserving 
of  freedom of  choice, in accordance with libertarian paternalism. 
As it means that nudges also target unbiased people (by providing 
them with the information they may lack), definition 3 is incompat-
ible with definition 2. Sunstein frequently puts forward the global 
positioning system (GPS) device as an example of  a nudge that 
works independently of  rationality failures: a GPS steers people in 
a certain direction whether they are biased or not.
 The difference between NN and NB is manifest regard-
ing the issue of  whether the provision or disclosure of  information 
counts as a nudge or not. In fact, some of  the examples provided 
by T&S consist of  providing information to the individual (e.g. fuel 
economy labels, energy efficiency labels, calorie labels, cigarette 
warnings, graphic health warnings, and social norms).3 Whether 
the provision of  information should qualify as a nudge has been 
controversial.3,11,18 In fact, while rational choices are determined 
by preferences and constraints under perfect information, ration-
al agents are also responsive to new information under imperfect 
information (Econs are not necessarily perfectly informed; they 
just process the available information in a consistent manner). By 
definition, the provision of  information does not forbid any op-
tion. Therefore, as long as it does not change the economic in-
centives either,4 providing information fits definition 1 while not 
fitting definition 2. As information provision fits NB but not NN, 
authors who explicitly addressed this issue hold contradictory posi-
tions.3,11 Relatedly, NB might also include what Grüne-Yanoff  and 
Hertwig19 qualify as “boosts”, that is, interventions that aim to help 
people making better choices for themselves by overcoming their 
rationality failures rather than exploiting them. More broadly, such 
interventions are part of  a “think” strategy, which in most elab-
orate form is deliberative democracy in which citizens engage in 
collective thinking and debate.20
WHY WE SHOULD ADOPT NB
One might argue that NB appears eventually as a catchall term, 
which reduces the specificity and value of  the concept of  nudge. 
Notably, it could be highlighted that information provision is pri-
marily a traditional economic policy (especially relevant when firms 
have an incentive to conceal information and consumers have no 
incentive to search for information). Information provided was ac-
tually used paternalistically way before the advent of  nudges (for 
example, the US policy tackling obesity has mainly drawn on infor-
mation provided to consumers with practices like calorie labeling). 
Still, we suggest that policymakers and academics should favor NB 
rather than NN for at least two reasons. The first reason is that 
nudge appears as an “uncatchable” object: even NB is insufficient to 
1. For NN to be coherent, the notion of  “economic incentives” in definition 1 had to be refined [3, 4, and 14]. Indeed, sticking to a meaning of  economic incen-
tives in terms of  financial constraints would entail to count as nudges numerous interventions that actually alter a rational aspect of  choice. Moreover, Mongin 
and Cozic [4] proposed that economic incentives should also include beliefs and preferences in addition to a physical set of  options and financial constraints. 
2. “Econs” refer to perfectly rational agents, by opposition with “Humans” who exhibit rationality failures. 
3. Regarding nudges that work through information, one must distinguish between interventions that involve the disclosure of  new information from inter-
ventions that consist of  manipulating or translating existing information (changing the format or presentation of  information without changing the content). 
The former are NB while the latter are NN (see below). 
4. For instance, disclosure of  information can generate public reputation costs thereby changing the economic incentives of  firms to engage in pro-environ-
mental behavior (e.g., the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory).
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decide whether a particular intervention qualifies as a nudge or not. 
As outlined by Mongin and Cozic,4 doing this based on definition 
2 (“nudge 2”) is problematic as deciding whether a particular psy-
chological feature (e.g. loss aversion, commitment, conformism) 
counts as a rationality failure or not can be tricky. Moreover, some 
interventions fit only one of  the two definitions of  T&S. For in-
stance, is the tobacco package warning “Smoking causes almost 9 out 
of  10 lung cancers” a nudge? While it steers behaviors by harnessing 
a logical fallacy (thereby satisfying definition 2), in this case, the 
tendency to equate the conditional probabilities P (A|B) and P 
(B|A), such a message may change beliefs or preferences (thus 
violating definition 1).
 The second reason for adopting NB is that when consid-
ering nudge, pragmatism should prevail. From the start, T&S put 
the focus on the use of  nudge by governments as a public poli-
cy tool to promote social welfare. In a public policy perspective, 
why a message such as “most people in your local area pay their tax on 
time” would be considered as a nudge while “smoking causes cancer” 
would not be considered as one? Suppose that a government is 
willing to implement nudges on a particular issue, selecting only 
interventions that fit the definition of  nudge adopted. The cost 
of  adopting NB is to increase the rate of  “false-positive nudges” (i.e., 
implementing interventions that actually do not harness rationality 
failures). The cost of  adopting NN, however, seems more signif-
icant: disregarding interventions that would effectively enhance 
social welfare. For instance, when tackling the public health issue 
of  smoking through channels other than regulation and economic 
incentives, does it really matter whether a warning such as “smoking 
causes cancer” harnesses a rationality failure or not? In brief, looking 
for a precise (unreachable?) definition of  nudge might distract us 
from the fact that nudge is primarily about public policy, hence 
pragmatism and effectiveness. We should avoid the trap of  abstrac-
tion and consider nudge as a broad method of  behavior influence, 
defined by not imposing significant material costs on individuals 
and eventually preserving freedom of  choice (definition 3).
NUDGE TYPES: AN INTEGRATIVE VIEW
If  one adopts NB, one must acknowledge a variety of  nudges. We 
suggest that the typologies of  nudges proposed so far fall into two 
categories, mechanism-oriented and technique-oriented. These 
two kinds of  typologies have been advanced in order to discuss the 
ethics and the effectiveness of  nudging, respectively. On one hand, 
mechanism-oriented typologies of  nudges aim at identifying the 
psychological mechanisms nudges work by.8-10,14,21 Such typologies 
have been introduced primarily to address the ethical issues raised 
by nudging.7,16,22-25 Indeed, understanding the underlying psycho-
logical mechanisms of  nudging is necessary to address recurrent 
ethical critics such as “nudges work better in the dark”.16 It turns out 
that all mechanism-oriented typologies of  nudges revolve around 
the distinction between System 1 (automatic processes) vs. System 
2 (deliberative processes).26
 Baldwin8 distinguished three types of  nudges according to 
the degree to which they affect the autonomy of  individuals. While 
first degree nudges encourage conscious deliberation, second (e.g. 
default rule) and third-degree nudges (e.g. framing) draw on auto-
matic responses. The difference between second and third-degree 
nudges refers to transparency and is, therefore, a difference of  de-
gree rather than of  kind. While embracing the broad definition 
of  nudge, Barton, and Grüne-Yanoff9 distinguished between three 
different types of  nudges according to the nature of  the inter-
ventional mechanism: heuristics-triggering and heuristics-block-
ing nudges on the one hand, and, on the other hand, informing 
nudges, which do not rely on any specific psychological shortcut. 
Sunstein21 himself  distinguished between System 1 nudges, which 
rely on automatic processing, from System 2 nudges, which rely on 
deliberative processing (while reporting that most people prefer 
System 2 nudges). In order to assess the effectiveness of  nudges 
in the health domain and discuss the associated ethical issue, Lin 
et al10 distinguished between two types of  nudges according to the 
amount of  reevaluation of  information on which people’s choices 
are made. While Type 1 nudges are based on automatic processing 
(e.g. smaller plate sizes, footprints), Type 2 nudges aim to promote 
deliberation (e.g. calorie labeling, health warnings).
 Finally, Hansen and Jespersen14 also proposed a Type 1/
Type 2 nudges distinction. However, their distinction draws on 
what is nudged rather than how nudging is done. In their frame-
work, Type 1 nudges influence behaviors (“non-voluntary actions”) 
whereas Type 2 nudges influence choices (the “end-result of  the in-
tervention of  reflective thinking”). Nudges can actually steer behaviors 
(e.g. driving speed) or bias choices (e.g. organ donation) in particu-
lar directions. However, one might wonder if  distinguishing types 
of  nudges based on what is nudged is the most relevant approach. 
Firstly, the frontier between behavior and choice is often fuzzy (for 
instance, in the examples provided by the authors, one might ques-
tion why the fly-in-the-urinal nudge is classified as a Type 2 nudge 
while the organization of  the cafeteria is classified as a Type 1 
nudge). Second and most importantly, nudges that target the same 
behavior/choice can actually differ significantly. Let’s consider the 
fly-in-the-urinal nudge, which prompts men to take aim. Accord-
ing to Hansen and Jespersen,14 this nudge qualifies as a Type 2 
nudge because it involves a decision to aim for the fly or not. Now 
imagine that a nudger sets up a device that provides to the user 
real-time feedback on his accuracy at taking aim. In the frame-
work of  Hansen and Jespersen,14 such a nudge would also qualify 
as a Type 2 nudge since the behavior results from an intervention 
of  reflective thinking. Still, both nudges are clearly different: one 
works by changing astutely the environment, the other works by 
providing information.
 On the other hand, technique-oriented typologies of  
nudges were introduced to address the issue of  the effectiveness 
of  nudging that is when and why nudges work. Such typologies 
identify the different techniques of  nudging, regardless of  the un-
derlying psychological mechanisms. The taxonomy of  Münscher, 
Vetter, and Scheuerle27 identifies nine categories of  choice archi-
tecture techniques (e.g. change choice defaults, translate infor-
mation, provide social reference point). Notably, Szaszi, Palinkas, 
Palfi, Szollosi, and Aczel28 relied upon this taxonomy to estimate 
the effectiveness of  nudging. The authors listed all empirical arti-
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cles (published between January 2008 and May 2016) in which a 
choice architecture intervention was tested, resulting in a database 
containing 116 empirical articles with 156 studies and more than 
422 tested interventions, which were classified according to the 
taxonomy of  Münscher et al.27 Recently, Congiu and Moscati29 also 
proposed a technique-oriented typology by distinguishing between 
nudge interventions based on “Environment” (e.g. items arrange-
ment, speed bumps on roads, defaults) (what might be called struc-
tural nudges) from those based on “Message” (e.g. “Smoking damages 
the lungs”,“Most of  your peers already bought it”) (what might be called 
informational nudges). In doing so, they formulated the broadest 
possible technique-oriented typology of  nudges (note that these 
two categories are not mutually exclusive: a single nudge may oper-
ate on both the Message dimension and the Environment dimen-
sion of  the choice architecture).
 Noting that mechanism and technique are orthogonal 
factors, and using the broadest dichotomy for each factor (Sys-
tem 1/System 2 and Environment/Message, respectively), one can 
provide an integrative view of  nudge types (see Table 1).
 
 Note that while such a framework might be useful to un-
derstand how nudges work and design new interventions, a priori 
classification can be hazardous. In fact, nudge types are more eas-
ily distinguishable in theory than in practice. Regarding the tech-
nique factor, deciding whether a particular intervention involves 
the provision of  information or not might be tricky. On one hand, 
some nudges that are thought to be informational do not involve 
the disclosure of  new information but rather the re-framing or 
translation of  information that was already available. In fact, most 
nudges that involve information (e.g. reminders, feedback, infor-
mation framing or translation) are actually structural nudges. On 
the other hand, nudges a priori categorized as structural actually 
do provide new information (such as defaults potentially providing 
information about a policymaker’s attitudes.30 Regarding the mech-
anism factor, deciding whether a particular intervention works by 
System 1 or System 2 can also be tricky. For instance, in some cas-
es, providing social information is aimed at stimulating deliberation 
(System 2). However, providing such information may do nothing 
more than provide a different heuristic rule by which people can 
make their choice (e.g., “I’ll choose the option that most people choose”). To 
us, the fact that categorizing nudges based on a priori thoughts can 
be quite difficult is an additional reason for embracing a pragmatic 
approach of  the nudge.
CONCLUSIONS
Since the seminal work of  T&S, two phases of  research can be 
identified in the growing field of  nudging. While the first phase was 
primarily theory-driven by focusing on theory and philosophy, the 
current phase is data-driven and aims at assessing the effectiveness 
of  nudges.31 We are still unable to define what nudge exactly is and 
we probably won’t.
 Accordingly, researchers interested in nudging should 
stick to two heuristic guidelines. The first one is to conceptually 
distinguish between nudge as a method of  behavior change (the 
mean of  nudging) from nudge as a type of  policy intervention (the 
goal of  nudging). The second one is to adopt a broad definition of  
nudge while acknowledging several types of  nudges. Those guide-
lines are notably suited to address the issues of  the effectiveness 
and ethics of  nudging, the ones that ultimately matter. In particu-
lar, assessing the effectiveness of  the different types of  nudges 
separately is a promising venue for further research.
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